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Abstract 
This thesis discusses how Djibouti, a country with minimal resources, survives by using 
its geostrategic location. The money Djibouti uses to survive is obtained through three revenue 
earners: The International Port of Djibouti, Rents from Foreign Military Bases, and Djibouti–
Ethiopia relations. The nature of the relationship between the government and these three sectors 
was described, along with the political structure of the patrimonial government and its relation to 
the country’s larger economic development. I also examined the political side of Djibouti to 
better ascertain its neopatrimonial role and how that adversely affects the economy. I then 
examined public, political, and economic challenges of the country in the international and 
public contexts. This analysis of the economic and political system revealed how 
neopatrimonialism and Djibouti’s role as a rentier state allow sustainability of the country 
despite minimal natural resources. Last, I assessed Djibouti’s potential in renewable resources 
and how those resources could pull Djibouti away from a neopatrimonial institution to a true 
democratic government. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Djibouti is a small country in the Horn of Africa the size of Belgium, with multiple 
challenges. It is located on the south shores of the Gulf of Tadjoura, sitting beside the narrow 
Bab el-Mandeb strait, which is a gateway to the Suez Canal at the mouth of the Red Sea off of 
the Gulf of Aden. 1  It has minimal natural resources, limited arable soil and vegetation, 
inadequate water sources plentiful enough to serve its population of nine hundred thousand 
people, and has temperatures that significantly hinder productivity. About 82% of the population 
live in or nearby the capital with the rest practicing nomadic farming.2 This makes Djibouti the 
most urbanized country in sub-Saharan Africa.3 Although the population rate is higher than the 
world average, it has significantly declined in the past three decades. Around two-fifths of the 
population is under age fifteen and the average life expectancy is sixty-three years.4 For every 
one hundred thousand live births, the country has 229 maternal deaths and the infant-mortality 
rate is 47.2 deaths for every one thousand births. Primary reasons for these numbers are severe 
malnutrition, high malaria and tuberculosis rates, and a shortage of accessible healthcare 
providers.5 
Djibouti is also mostly dependent on outside sources of aid and income, and requires 
constant imports to feed its population; so much so that 90% of Djibouti’s food supply is 
																																																								
1 Monte Reel, “Djibouti Is Hot: How a Forgotten Sandlot of a Country Became a Hub of International Power 
Games.,” Bloomberg Businessweek, 23 March 2016, 2. 
2 “Djibouti,” Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations, 2007. http://www.encyclopedia.com/places/africa/djibouti-
political-geography/djibouti. 
3 Peter Schraeder and Catherine Cutbill, “Djibouti,” Britannica, 11 April 2016. 




imported, which makes it highly dependent on international market prices.6 Over the past ten 
years, the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) has grown steadily, with Djibouti having 
registered an average of 5% GDP growth for the last five years and anticipates maintaining that 
same growth rate in the years to come.7 This income is obtained primarily from three areas: 
Djibouti’s port, rents from military bases, and Djibouti’s relationship with Ethiopia. This income 
primarily has benefitted the government, which has tended to intensify control of the acting 
government. 
In 1999, the country held its first multiparty elections after the authoritarian reign of 
Hassan Gouled Aptidon. However, soon after the elections, Djibouti’s current President Ismaïl 
Omar Guelleh soon returned the country to an authoritarian one-party state through a series of 
measures that essentially eliminated any opposition, discussed in detail in this paper.8 President 
Guelleh, continuing the ruling legacy of his uncle who ruled from 27 June 1977–8 May 1999, 
now maintains power and control of Djibouti through a neopatrimonial-based government 
system, ruling the country similar to that of a dictator. 9  Neopatrimonialism is a form of 
governance in which all power flows directly from the country’s leader, while the distinction 
between the public and private sectors becomes vague.10 
Djibouti is also a rentier state, which means it receives money from other countries in 
exchange for a particular resource, which in the case of Djibouti is its geostrategic location and 
control of the port. Hossein Mahdavy defines a rentier state as one that derives all or a substantial 
																																																								
6 “Djibouti,” World Food Programme, 2017, https://www.wfp.org/countries/djibouti. 
7 Yewondwossen Muluken, “Djibouti: Africa’s Singapore?” Capital 17, no. 836 (2014), http://capitalethiopia.com 
/2014/12/16/djibouti-africas-singapore/#.WIpcn7GZO8U. 
8 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Djibouti.” 
9 “Djibouti.” Wikipedia, 5 March 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Djibouti. 
10 Dele Olowu and Paulos Chanie, eds., State Fragility and State Building in Africa: Cases from Eastern and 
Southern Africa. United Nations University Series on Regionalism (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International, 
2016), 164. 
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portion of its national revenues from the rent of indigenous resources to external clients.11 
Rentier countries receive significant rent, paid directly to the government. In most cases, the 
country’s citizens never see the benefits. Rents are monies paid by foreign individuals or 
governments to individuals or governments of a given country.12 In Guelleh’s case, the rentier 
state has reinforced the neopatrimonial government. 
In 2001, the United States needed a location somewhere in the vicinity of the Middle East 
to set up a base to combat terrorism and was willing to pay for a good location. President 
Guelleh and his neopatrimonial government saw an opportunity and took advantage of the 
situation to make a profit. They agreed to the U.S. request, thereby turning Djibouti into a rentier 
state. Previously, Djibouti was a country exercising only a neopatrimonial government model, 
but upon agreement, it transitioned into a rentier state. As more income comes into the Guelleh 
administration, his administration benefits, further separating him from the local population. 
In this thesis, I study the case of the economic and political system of Djibouti because I 
want to discern how Guelleh’s neopatrimonial government sustain the country and its citizens in 
the absence of other natural resources. What are the potential risks and advantages of 
neopatrimonial rentier states in Africa in developing strong governments that are effective in 
ruling and maintaining political and economic stability? To answer this question, I researched the 
following questions: 
• How does Djibouti’s strategic location affect the development of the political and 
economic sectors? 
• How has the neopatrimonial government used rentierism to its advantage? 
																																																								
11 Hossein Mahdavy, “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran,” 





Djibouti has two main ethnic groups from neighboring countries: the Afar and the Issa. 
These two main groups have a history of highly charged ethnic tensions that polarize the country. 
The Issa are a Somali clan who live in the southern part of the country and comprise the majority 
of the population. The Afar are of Ethiopian origin and live in the northern part of Djibouti. 
Although the Afar are the smaller of the two groups, they have been in Djibouti longer. 
After independence from France in 1977, Djibouti was able to maintain a balanced 
government between the Afar and the Issa; however, tensions have always existed between the 
two groups. The Afar, favored by the French, were better educated and held more government 
positions of power rather than the Issa. After independence, power shifted almost completely 
from the Afar to the Issa. In 1999 it was an Issa who was installed as Djibouti’s first president 
and soon after, tensions erupted when President Hassan Gouled Aptidon installed an 
authoritarian one-party state rule, dominated by the Issa community. 
In November 1991, after years of economic and political segregation, the Afar-associated 
Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) led a rebellion against the 
government. Within a year of intense fighting, Former President Hassan Gouled Aptidon 
acknowledged that a change was needed and by 1992, a new constitution was produced 
promising decentralization, human rights, and multiparty elections. The majority of the conflict 
ended by 1994 when a faction of FRUD agreed to lay down arms in exchange for a small number 
of government jobs.13 In 1999, Ismail Omar Guelleh was elected in a multiparty election.14 
However, smaller FRUD splinter groups continued to fight until 2001, when the final peace 
																																																								
13 Amedee Bollee, “Djibouti: From French Outpost to US Base,” Review of African Political Economy 30, no. 97 
(2003): 481. 
14 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Djibouti.” 
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accord was signed. However, most of the promises in the accord have yet to be met and tensions 
have recently been on the rise.15 
Due to the past twenty years of conflict, the economic impact has been severe. During the 
conflict, the government rerouted funds from the social services and economic-development 
budget to the military budget to fulfill the needs of the military. This caused Djibouti’s economy 
to be weakened and ultimately set back any developmental progress in Djibouti. 16  As the 
economy, primarily a service economy with less than 20% of GDP coming from the industrial 
sector, continued to weaken, its strategic position became increasingly important as a resource 
for income for the government.17 By leasing land for military bases and port fees, Djibouti’s 
economy transitioned even more to a rentier state, which consolidated into a neopatrimonial form 
of government to survive. 
																																																								
15 Jennifer N. Brass, “Djibouti’s Unusual Resource Curse,” Journal of Modern African Studies 46, no. 4 (2008): 
534, doi:10.1017/S0022278X08003479. 
16 Ibid., 535. 
17 “2017 Index of Economic Freedom: Djibouti.” The Heritage Foundation, 2017, http://www.heritage.org/index 
/country/djibouti. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Before exploring the case of Djibouti and its role as a neopatrimonial rentier state, it is 
important to spend some time examining the background and development of neopatrimonialism 
as well as the consequences associated with being a rentier state. This chapter will examine the 
ideas, history, and thoughts of first, neopatrimonialism, and then rentierism. 
Dele Olowu and Paulos Chanie define neopatrimonialism as “a form of governance in 
which all power flows directly from the leader, while the distinction between the public and 
private sectors becomes vague.”18 The neopatrimonial system exists next to and feeds on modern 
bureaucracies and needs income to be productive. That income appears through rentierism, 
defined as when a government receives a percentage of its monies from external rents. However, 
as the number of rents increased, so did the strengthening of the neopatrimonial system. 
In the early stages, neopatrimonialism was not necessarily synonymous with corruption 
or weakness of the state, but instead, was a way to exercise power that incorporated Weberian 
forms of patrimonialism and rational-legal authority.19 Weber saw patrimonialism as a form of 
traditional domination in which the ruler not only sees the administration and military as his or 
her personal instruments but he also sees patrimonialism in which the ruler governs by 
tradition.20 In his writings, Weber used several other forms of rule to analyze domination. These 
forms are the following: 
“Estate-type domination,” a form of patrimonialism characterized by the appropriation of 
power by administrative staff; “Sultanism,” characterized by the ruler’s personal 
																																																								
18 Olowu and Chanie, State Fragility and State Building in Africa, 164. 
19 Thandika Mkandawire, “Neopatrimonialism and the Political Economy of Economic Performance in Africa,” 
World Politics 67, no. 3 (2015): 565, doi:10.1017/S004388711500009X. 
20 Ola Agevall and Richard Swedberg, The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts, 2nd ed. 
(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 247. 
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autonomy; and “Prebendalism,” maintained through benefices—that is, through 
traditional allowances, incomes and the like that cannot be inherited.21 
These three forms of Weberian patrimonialism, coupled with rational-legal authority, which is “a 
form of leadership in which authority is largely tied to legal rationality, legal legitimacy, and 
bureaucracy,”22 refer to the early idea of neopatrimonialism. 
In its early incarnation, neopatrimonialism evolved from the “patrimonial” system where 
peasants, the landless, and poor urban dwellers committed themselves to a “patron” to secure a 
steady job, a plot of land to cultivate, material goods, wealth, or protection.23 This traditional 
form of governance was accepted and clients depended on their patrons for services and 
resources whereas patrons needed them for their labor, which increased and secured their status 
and power. Due to the historical continuity of this political system, Daan Beekers and Bas van 
Gool write, patronage is not a stage in economic development, but rather an “ethos.” 24 
Furthermore, patronage is not necessarily a political system, but more of a principle of 
interpersonal relations. 
According to Milton Esman in his study of “representative bureaucracy,” as states grew, 
new hierarchies also grew and evolved from farmer-peasant patron-clients to highly positioned 
patrons in the form of ministries, departments, and officials. With the formation and formality of 
these dyads, it became easier to disguise the nature of the patron–client agreement behind 
administrative processes. Governmental jobs with a steady income, security, prestige, and 
																																																								
21 Ibid., 248. 
22 Boundless. “Rational-Legal Authority.” Rational-Legal Authority. Boston, MA, 2017, https://www.boundless 
.com/sociology/textbooks/boundless-sociology-textbook/government-15/politics-power-and-authority-112 
/rational-legal-authority-623-8985/. 
23 James Scott, “The Erosion of Patron–Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia,” Journal of Asian 
Studies 32, no. 1 (1972): 37, doi:10.2307/2053176. 
24 Daan Beekers and Bas van Gool, “From Patronage to Neopatrimonialism. Postcolonial Governance in Sub-
Sahara Africa and beyond,” VA University Amsterdam, 2012, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle 
/1887/19547/WP101jan2013.pdf?sequence=4, 8. 
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retirement also became highly sought and furthered the importance of these political patrons.25 
Due to these expanding hierarchies controlling public resources in the form of land, schools, 
housing, protection, and health facilities, to name a few, it is understandable that political leaders 
started seeing votes and group support as quid pro quo for their services. 
Over time, this system led to the centralization of political relations and economic 
activity more than was the case in traditional patron–client systems. The rise of this modern 
statehood, traditionally governed by patrons, resulted in a “‘hybrid’ political culture in which the 
public institutions of ‘modern’ governance came to exist alongside cultural practices of 
‘indigenous’ governance.” 26  The effects of this “hybrid” political culture had significant 
outcomes on lower class clients. Because political actors no longer gained riches by having 
people work for them (they now had direct access to the state’s resources due to their position), 
they became less dependent on their clients and more dependent on the individuals who provided 
them with their opportunity to gain political office. As a result, their previous clients were no 
longer able to rely on them for protection and support.27 This led to patrons becoming more 
powerful and their clients eventually becoming obsolete. Neopatrimonialism was the outcome of 
this process. 
Political leaders in a neopatrimonial system who are striving to gain control or striving to 
maintain control of a state have more to gain. Because the person who controls the government 
gains the opportunity to selectively take sums of money greater than anything acquired through 
any type of economically productive activity, the pressure to control the state is overwhelming. 
																																																								
25 Milton Esman, “Public Administration and Conflict Management in Plural Societies: The Case for 
Representative Bureaucracy,” Public Administration and Development 19, no. 4 (1999): 354. doi:10.1002/(SICI) 
1099-162X(199910)19:4<353::AID-PAD86>3.0.CO;2-B. 
26 Beekers and van Gool, “From Patronage to Neopatrimonialism,” 10. 
27 Ibid., 11. 
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This practice of control also allows the leader to effectively become the sole decision maker over 
most governmental matters. Max Weber wrote, “For the political administration is treated as a 
purely personal affair of the ruler, and the political power is considered part of his personal 
property … The office and the exercise of public authority serve the ruler and the official on 
which the office was bestowed, they do not serve impersonal purposes.”28 
In some cases, some leaders are so affluent in this aspect that they do not need the 
support of the local population. These governments and countries have enough outside support 
and income that financial support through taxes from the country’s residents is unnecessary. 
These events became more prominent after African countries started to gain their independence. 
As explained by Giulia Piccolino in her reference to an example of aid rents, “since the end of 
the Cold War donors have made aid available to democratizing states on a privilege basis.”29 It is 
possible that due to this occurrence, these states may have been deterred in the development of 
an effective taxation system by the expectation of continued donor funding. Over time, this 
format benefited political leaders who were operating in a neopatrimonial system because it 
permitted them to come into an influential position where they simply received money. The 
result was a lack of systems in place to obtain money from the country’s citizens. Here, renter 
states and rentierism comes into play. 
Rentier states use rentierism to provide funds needed to sustain their country’s economy. 
In Africa’s society today, it is a crucial part of everyday life. As defined by Christopher Clapham, 
“the rentier state is an organization which maintains itself by appropriating the income in excess 
																																																								
28 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978), 1028–29. 
29 Giulia Piccolino, A Democratic Rentier State? Taxation, Aid Dependency, and Political Representation in Benin 
(Hamburg, Germany: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2014), 8, https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en 
/system/files/publications/wp253_piccolino.pdf. 
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of the costs of production, or rents, derived from production for a global market.”30 The concept 
of the rentier system was first introduced by Hossein Mahdavy in his 1970 paper entitled, The 
Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran. The 
paper’s main argument is that a country heavily dependent on natural resources, especially the 
financial aspect of funding the government, ultimately creates a weak state. These systems first 
developed as the result of these country’s dependence on export revenues, specifically, those 
derived from mineral exporting or other forms of royalties, which then led to the materialization 
of the rentier state. Another explanation for the development of rentier states is that it is often 
easier to maintain authority on a country’s “renter state” nature by dispersing wanted resources 
to favored constituents rather than through growth-oriented policies and a well-regulated 
economy. This format, in turn, promotes political corruption. Not only does this system tempt 
owners of natural resources to use rents for short-term gain rather than investing in long-term 
development, but it also promotes corruption and authoritarianism.31 However, that outcome is 
not assured. Botswana, for example, has an economy highly dependent on natural resources and 
is a thriving democracy. The profit gained from the natural resources controlled by the state goes 
into developing the economy and people in the lower classes benefit from its success. 
Rentier activities accrue through a form of “rent” (or external rent), defined by Mahdavy 
as monies paid by one government to other.32 However, as economics evolved, so too did the 
definition. Thus, Catherine Boone explains the connection of “rent” and “economic rent.” 
According to Boone, economic rents are “‘unearned profits’ which derive from disequilibrium 
prices.” Disequilibrium prices refer to prices that do not achieve balance in the market, thus they 
																																																								
30 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 70. 
31 Olowu and Chanie, State Fragility and State Building in Africa, 165. 
32 Mahdavy, “The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States,” 428. 
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do not achieve market stability. For instance, a price below equilibrium price creates a shortage 
in goods and a price above equilibrium price creates a surplus. Disequilibrium prices succeed 
when nonmarket forces alter supply and demand (for example, outside sources restrict supply to 
drive up prices). As clarified by Boone, the notion of rent builds on the original definition of rent 
in two ways. First, the idea of rent adopts “the idea of income or profit generated in a ‘non-
productive’ activity (that is, income or profit which does not represent surplus value created 
through the on-going combination of capital and wage labor).”33 Second, the idea of rent gives 
meaning to the term “nonmarket forces,” which can be defined as “direct government 
intervention in markets. Thus, rentier activities are defined as politically mediated opportunities 
for obtaining wealth through non-productive economic activities.”34 
Rentier states are problematic because they are neither accountable for creating 
circumstances for a productive economy, nor do they rely on their country’s citizens to raise 
money to provide those citizens with desired goods. Rather, in the case of a rentier state, the 
country receives payment from the entity that removes the sought-after goods. A rentier state 
amasses wealth in several ways: first, through the privatization of state resources; second, 
through state grants in the form of loans, property, subsidies, and cash transfers; and third, by the 
seizure of rents as a result of state intervention in markets. Examples of the last would be bribes, 
payola, and obtaining government contracts awarded on a noncompetitive basis. 
A second issue found with rentierism is that it promotes state power. This is problematic 
because state power not only creates opportunities for the society’s elite, but also funnels 
																																																								
33 Catherine Boone, “The Making of a Rentier Class: Wealth Accumulation and Political Control in Senegal,” 
Journal of Development Studies 26, no. 3 (1990): 427. doi:10.1080/00220389008422163. 
34 Ibid. 
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economic resources directly to members of the dominant class.35 In Africa and in most cases, the 
dominant class also tends to be the political class. Thus, state power, promoted by rentierism, 
aids in the creation of private wealth, which invariably curtails economic and political 
development. Rentierism also creates significant obstacles for effective and accountable 
governments. Due to its corrupt nature between the state and the corporation, as well as in the 
spending of money by agents of the state, it is a system that disperses great sums of money that 
are unavailable for public inspection. This enables funds to “disappear,” which further alienates 
the country’s citizens for whom those funds were economically intended. Fostering this type of 
system propagates lack of accountability because it does not need to create a fiscal system to tax 
people, which again, weakens the relationship between the government and its denizens.36 
A third downside to rentierism is that the dependence of outside funds can lead to 
possible risks of hostile takeovers from investors. If enough investors were unhappy with the 
current situation, it is feasible that one group could potential outmaneuver or take control of the 
other. 
Still, although the majority of researchers argue the negative aspects of rents in rentierism, 
other researchers have shown that the idea of economic rents as fundamentally damaging for 
development is incorrect. In fact, researchers offered the idea that, in the early phases of 
development, personal, informal relationships between financiers and officials may be more 
significant than a rules-based governance. David Booth argues that although most African states 
are neopatrimonial, various forms of neopatrimonialism can dictate the outcome and use of 
																																																								
35 Ibid., 428. 
36 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, “Natural Resources and Political Institutions: The Rentier State,” 25 June 
2013, http://whynationsfail.com/blog/2013/6/25/natural-resources-and-political-institutions-the-rentier-sta.html. 
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economic rents.37 For example, one form known as “developmental patrimonialism” has and 
uses a centralized management of economic rent in support of a long-term vision. Developmental 
patrimonialism allows the ruling elite the capability and power to use rents productively to 
further economic growth, rather than receiving large monetary gains from short-term investments. 
Ruling individuals now have a more secure source of revenue and, by using this approach, make 
anticorruption efforts more effective due to key components of the state technocracy (the control 
of a society by government comprised of technical elites) being subjected to corporate discipline. 
If used in this manner, economic rents processed in a neopatrimonial society can have a positive 
impact on the citizenry. 
Booth uses research conducted on seven “middle African” countries (Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda) as examples.38 Booth examined the 
economic performance from independence to the present day. All countries in this study were 
tropical and resource poor as well as having strong to semistrong economic performance. 
Additionally, all had one main political leader who acted in an authoritarian manner. Upon 
review of his research, Booth concluded that what all these strongly and semistrongly performing 
regimes had in common was a system to centralize economic rent management as well as focus 
rent-generation on the long term.39 Specifically, these country’s leaders had a structure in place 
that was solely focused on rents. This system allowed a person or a group of people to determine 
what rents would be created and how they were to be distributed. Mechanisms were in place to 
centralize rents and guide them toward long-term growth based on precise plans envisioned by 
																																																								
37 David Booth, “Development as a Collective Action Problem: Addressing the Real Challenges of African 
Governance,” Africa Power and Politics Program, 2012, 22–23, http://www.institutions-
africa.org/filestream/20121024-appp-synthesis-report-development-as-a-collective-action-problem. 
38 Ibid., 25. 
39 Ibid. 
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the country’s leaders. These mechanisms differed from country to country, but always 
encompassed some combination of the following: 
• A strong, visionary leader (often an independence or war-time hero) 
• A single or dominant party system 
• A competent and confident economic technocracy 
• A strategy that included, at least partially, the most important political groups in some 
of the benefits of growth, and 
• A sound policy framework, meaning a broadly procapitalist, prorural bias.40 
These leaders were aware and focused on the long-term productive investment of their rents and 
were disciplined enough to adhere to them to expand their country’s income. 
Centralizing rentierism allows the leadership of these countries the ability to form limits 
on rent-seeking and to steer rent creation into areas with high economic potential. Additionally, 
when leaders play a coordinating role in rentierism and focus on long-horizon goals, they are 
seeking rent-earning opportunities as activities that involve value-added or transformations over 
time, rather than the simple quick wins of gaining money through embezzlement or market 
taxation.41 By orientating a government in this method, development results are noticeable and 
improvements emerge in the areas of rural incomes as well as in the expansion of nonagricultural 
activities for domestic and export markets. 
Neopatrimonialism has had a long history. Originally developing from the patrimonial 
system of peasants and patrons, neopatrimonialism came from a system where both sides gained 
something in return. As Beekers and van Gool stated, “patronage was not a developmental stage, 
																																																								
40 Ibid., 26. 
41 Ibid. 
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but rather a principle of interpersonal relationships.” 42  However, that changed as newer 
hierarchies evolved. With change, these relationships were no longer needed and instead of being 
a system of balance, the system changed to be more one-sided. Patrons became more powerful 
than their clients and the system became obsolete. This ultimately developed into 
neopatrimonialism and, as previously discussed, the political leader does not need the support of 
the population because he or she has enough income from outside revenues such as rents. 
Rentierism, in return, ensures that these leaders stay in power, which in many cases promotes 
political corruption and creates several issues that are not beneficial to economic or political 
development of a country. 
																																																								
42 Beekers and van Gool, “From Patronage to Neopatrimonialism,” 8. 
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Chapter Three: Case Study 
This chapter will use Djibouti as a case study to explore how neopatrimonialism and 
rentierism in Djibouti contribute to sustainability of the current administration. As previously 
mentioned, Djibouti has three primary capacities in which its revenue is supplied: (a) The 
international port of Djibouti, (b) rents from foreign military bases, and (c) The Djibouti–
Ethiopia relationship. These three areas, in combination, represent about 80% of the country’s 
GDP. Furthermore, along with government revenue from rentierism, the service economy, 
including banks and supporting services, is responsible for more than three quarters of the 
GDP. 43  This is important because Djibouti’s geographic location supports and enriches the 
rentier state and the money that flows in allows Djibouti to continuing functioning using a 
neopatrimonial government. Specifically, although President Gullah came into power on a 
democratic platform, through patrimonialism and leveraging the country as a rentier state, he has 
managed to assume and create an authoritarian government, if not a dictatorship. This allows the 
government of Djibouti to maintain control as a rentier state because it has continuous, incoming 
rents from the foreign militaries it hosts. 
This case study will explore the patrimonial ties that allow the government to maintain 
structure and political control. This paper considers the factors in Djibouti’s political and 
economic environment that permit its political leader to continue to mold and sustain a 
government favorable to his own purposes. Finally, it will analyze how the government is 
sustainable, even while keeping the poor impoverished, the unemployed jobless, and the 
uneducated ignorant. To answer these questions, this case study examined each of the three main 
GDP providers to understand how the system functions. 
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The International Port of Djibouti 
Djibouti is located at the entrance to the Red Sea, well situated on the shipping routes 
between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, making it a main maritime passage as well as a 
primary trading route between the East and the West. This passageway, a strategic meeting point 
between Africa and Asia, has been used since 3500 BCE by the Egyptians, Phoenicians, 
Byzantines, and Ptolemaists. Historical individuals such as the Queen of Sheba and Cyrus the 
Great used the Red Sea to escape with treasures and develop extensive trade routes up and down 
the coasts of surrounding continents, creating international trade and developing written 
languages.44 
The port was created around 1888 by Leonce Lagarde, Somaliland’s first French 
governor.45 Evolved from Ethiopia’s need for a maritime outlet to its railway line, the port began 
construction in 1897 and turned out to be in an ideal location because it provided easy access and 
sheltered anchorage. Like the port, Ethiopia’s railway also began construction in 1897 and once 
the railway line was completed in 1917, the port itself grew at a rapid rate. Between 1960 and 
1970, port activity boomed and was developed as part of an international maritime exchange 
network, which allowed Djibouti to act as the shipping lane’s service station because the Red Sea 
was now one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. From 1954, overnight traffic increased 
fourfold in the next ten years, reaching a peak of 1.8 million tons in 1965. 
Due to Djibouti’s strategic location, port authorities were successful in turning the port 
into a regional hub for the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, encompassing the continents of Europe, 
Africa, and Asia. Another significant improvement that aided in the port’s success was 
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containerization. Containerization was one of the factors that allowed Djibouti to enter this new 
period of development, and in February 1985, Djibouti’s first modern container terminal began 
operations.46 
Containerization or container shipping is different from conventional shipping because it 
uses “containers” of various standard sizes to load, transport, and unload goods. This allows 
containers to be moved seamlessly between ships, trucks, and trains. The two most important and 
most commonly used sizes today are the twenty-foot and forty-foot lengths. The twenty-foot 
container, referenced as a Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (TEU), became the industry standard 
reference; now, cargo volume and vessel capacity are commonly measured in TEU. The forty-
foot length container—literally two TEU—became known as the Forty-foot Equivalent Unit 
(FEU) and is the most frequently used container today.47 
Additionally, due to limited agriculture and industry, Djibouti’s international trade, which 
is primarily conducted through the port, accounts for 80–90% of the country’s economy, with 
goods to and from Ethiopia accounting for about 70% of traffic.48 Between 1998 and 2007, 
demand for the transportation of more goods to Ethiopia grew by 18%, ultimately increasing the 
amount of goods in and out of the Port of Djibouti.49 Within several years, the Port of Djibouti’s 
container terminal was operating at four hundred thousand TEUs, which is considered full 
capacity.50 It fulfills a relatively even balance of trade between Ethiopia and Djibouti, but does 
not provide much room for growth in trade. 
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As a result of these factors, the government decided it was imperative that the Port of 
Djibouti expand operations to accommodate economic growth. Some issues were addressed by 
retrofitting the port as a transshipment point for other ships. This means the port receives giant 
container ships and transfers the cargo to smaller ships that can deliver to smaller ports along the 
coast of east Africa. From there, goods continue to be transferred to even smaller vessels and 
sent out further. However, because the old port was functioning at capacity and the old quay was 
too short to accommodate more than one large container ship, the decision was made to build a 
new port terminal in Doraleh. Because containerized shipping accounts for about 90% of bulk 
cargo worldwide, and the demand for container handling in Djibouti was forecasted to increase 
from 1.2 to 1.8 million TEUs in 2015, the decision to find a new port terminal was sound.51 
Funding for the port came through private sector participation, which allows the capital 
requirements to be raised in international markets. DP World Djibouti, a subsidiary of DP World, 
managed the project in Doraleh, which is 8 km from the existing Port of Djibouti. The total cost 
of the project was estimated at USD 396 million, of which USD 133 million was in the form of 
equity. One main financer of the project was the Islamic World Bank, which provided USD 65 
million, reasoning that the project was worth the risk due to the strategic importance of the port 
as well as market demand.52 The new port began development in December 2006 and was 
completed in November 2009, creating the capacity to become a regional transshipment hub 
serving eastern and southern Africa. In 2012, the new terminal handled over 743,000 TEUs, 
almost double the number from 360,000 TEUs at the old port in 2008. Now that Doraleh Port has 
been completed, it will help enhance the role of regional integration in the country’s economic 
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growth. 53  However, although this latest investment is beneficial for Djibouti, it may be 
threatened in the near future by neighbors. 
Surrounding area customers, especially Ethiopia, are forced to use Djibouti’s port. Due to 
Ethiopia’s continued economic expansion, coupled with Djibouti’s ever-increasing import fees, 
Ethiopia has been looking to lessen its dependence on Djibouti, which collects at least USD 300 
million in port fees from it every year.54 Recently, DP World has secured a thirty-year deal to run 
and manage the Port of Berbera in the unrecognized Republic of Somaliland.55 DP World would 
manage 65% of the project, which would leave the government of Somalia with the remaining 
35%. The company will invest around USD 442 million into the Berbera port undertaking, as 
well as provide an alternate port in the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait. Because the Yemeni port of Aden 
is a war zone, the Mombasa port is congested, and the port in Eritrea is unwelcoming, this deal 
could return Berbera to a major Horn of Africa trading hub, while providing competition for 
Djibouti. Although Djibouti displays periods of economic growth, it is very possible that given 
all of its political and economic issues, the country could enter an economic decline quickly if its 
port customers were to find services elsewhere, such as in the Berbera Port in Somaliland. 
The idea of using the Somaliland port by not only Ethiopia but other port customers as 
well is appealing for several reasons. Somaliland has a developing government and an emerging, 
stable economy. Although it is an autonomous region that is not globally recognized, the region 
currently has limited problems and is English speaking.56 Once completed, Somaliland’s port 
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will be open and inviting. Djibouti, in contrast, with all its international guests, is easily pulled 
into disputes and grievances between different national interests. For example, when China 
announced its intentions to construct a facility in Djibouti, the United States opposed the idea 
and petitioned Djibouti to reconsider. However, Djibouti’s decision remained firm, indicating 
that the United States and China needed to accept the fact that they were going to be neighbors in 
a country the size of New Jersey. This issue is irrelevant in Somaliland because no foreign 
militaries are located there; thus no reason exists for discontent. Customers who were to move 
from Djibouti’s port to Somaliland’s might not have to worry about the continual scrutiny, and 
the competition between the two ports could provide more affordable import/export rates. If 
enough movement were to occur, the effect could be damaging to Djibouti because the port 
provides one of highest sources of income in the economy. 
The international Port of Djibouti is just one example of how strategic location affects the 
country’s development. By upgrading the port and enlarging its capabilities, Djibouti is able to 
accommodate more customers and, therefore, earn more revenue. In addition to the recent 
upgrades, Djibouti’s port is considered a strategic location for other countries because it is 
situated in the middle of a highly used shipping lane that connects Europe to Asia. Because of its 
location, the popularity of this waterway diminishing is unlikely. Djibouti’s government knows 
this and uses it to their advantage by trying to service as many vessels as it can. 
Djibouti and Ethiopian Relations 
As alluded to above, trade with Ethiopia is a huge driver in Djibouti’s economy. The two 
are intimately interlinked and one could not survive without the other. Ethiopia, which has a 
burgeoning population approaching one hundred million, is the primary user of Djibouti’s port 
and currently generates around 70% of the trade that passes through the country. Examples of 
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imports from Ethiopia include electricity, food, water, and khat just to name a few. This makes 
Djibouti considerably reliant on its neighbors, which means international relations must be 
highly organized and emphasized; otherwise the economy would fall apart. Much, if not all, of 
the current port upgrades and structural projects were solely done to benefit Ethiopia and its 
growing economy. 
Similarly, Djibouti’s economy would be nonexistent without Ethiopia. Almost one-third 
of Djibouti’s GDP comes from its trade relations with Ethiopia. Due to Ethiopia’s precarious 
relationship with Somalia and the inadequacy of Eritrea’s port, Ethiopia is forced to depend 
solely on the Port of Djibouti to conduct international trade, as well as keep its economy 
functioning. In contrast, the service sectors dominates the majority of Djibouti’s GDP: transport, 
communications, commerce, and some tourism. Generally, the service sector dominates this area 
whereas transport and related logistical services remain the backbone of the economy. Because 
of this structure, Djibouti must obtain everything as inexpensively and efficiently as it can, which 
it does by importing those items through Ethiopia. Due to this reasoning and the important role 
Ethiopia plays in Djibouti’s economy, Djibouti cannot afford to deny Ethiopia any desire. If it 
did, it could potentially lose Ethiopia’s business, which would adversely affect Djibouti’s 
economy. It has placed itself precariously in the hands of its neighbor and if it were to withdraw 
from the relationship, Djibouti’s economy would collapse. 
The hostility between Ethiopia and Somalia has deep roots. They have a significant, 
volatile history that dates back to the late 1520s when Imam Ahmed Ibin Ibrahim al-Ghazi, a 
Somali, declared war against Ethiopia and its Emperor.57 Since then, Ethiopia and Somalia have 
continually clashed over the disputed territory of Ogaden (present day Eastern Ethiopia), which 
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led to the Ethiopia–Somalia war of 1977 when Somalia invaded Ethiopia. Although the Somalis 
came very close to attaining the disputed territory, the Ethiopians, backed by the intervention of 
socialist countries, defeated the Somalis and reclaimed the land. The Somalis never fully 
recovered from their loss.58 Thus, to this day, Ethiopia and Somalia are still on strained terms 
and Djibouti quickly became Ethiopia’s answer in solidifying primary port access. 
Ethiopia is also essential to Djibouti because it is considered a gateway to not only 
Ethiopia, but ultimately, to other potential markets just beyond such as South Sudan, Somalia, 
Rwanda, and parts of Uganda. To Djibouti, any landlocked country is a potential market.59 In an 
interview with the Khaleej Times, Djibouti’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, stated that Djibouti would like to target other markets 
besides Ethiopia to open up its markets to those countries that are landlocked.60 These markets 
would help diversify the economy by implementing different partnerships. Due to the current 
size of the port, Djibouti is now able to facilitate and advertise its services to its surrounding 
neighbors. Although Djibouti does not yet have any programs or arrangements with other 
landlocked countries outside of Ethiopia, the programs it does have are encouraging. To date, 
Djibouti and Ethiopia both use Ethiopia’s electricity grid, share a 752-kilometer railway line 
linking the two capitals, and are in the process of building several massive pipelines that will 
transport natural gas, fuel, and drinking water.61 
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Although Ethiopia and Djibouti’s relationship is interdependent and intertwined, 
challenges and an atmosphere of mistrust sometimes prevail. Most of this mistrust is largely due 
to economic problems: arguments over the railway, air transportation, and border/customs issues. 
Although Djibouti and Ethiopia are capable of working together, as seen in their collaborative 
projects such as building the railway and the dual-use of Ethiopia’s electricity grid, friction 
between the two countries postpones development and growth. This was one reason the railway 
between Ethiopian and Djibouti took so long to complete. One cause for this mistrust is that 
Djibouti controls the rents, rates, and transit fees for everything that Ethiopia imports and exports, 
and at times, puts the Ethiopians on the defensive when they believe the rates are unnecessary or 
unfair.62 
Djiboutians also do not fully understand the important role that Ethiopia plays in their 
daily lives. In an interview conducted by The Capital’s Deputy Editor-In-Chief, Teguest Yilma, 
Djibouti’s ambassador to Ethiopia, Mohamed Idriss Farah, states that this misunderstanding 
among Djiboutians and Ethiopians is difficult to change.63 He believes this is because many 
Djiboutians do not read the newspaper or listen to the radio. However, informing the people is 
something Farah wants to change. Ethiopia is linked to Djibouti in its history, culture, and 
religion, so the idea of Ethiopia developing alone without Djibouti is a risk both countries are 
unwilling to take. If Ethiopia were to reestablish ties with Somalia, then Ethiopia would not need 
Djibouti or its port, leaving Djibouti without a significant portion of its GDP income. 
Djibouti and Ethiopia have a unique relationship that ensures cooperation. Djibouti needs 
Ethiopia to maintain continuous imports and exports to ensure a consistent flow of port 
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transportation fees. This constant influx of income then goes directly to the government, which it 
uses at the political leader’s discretion. Ethiopia, in contrast, needs Djibouti for their access to 
the water, to arrange shipment of any international goods, and to access other potential markets. 
Although challenges and difficulties preside, this arrangement demonstrates one more way that 
Djibouti’s strategic location affects the country’s economic development. 
Foreign Military Bases 
Revenue from foreign military bases are also an important and necessary resource for 
Djibouti. As explained below, militarily-strategic location garners much needed income. When 
President Guelleh was elected president in 1999, he was faced with one main issue: economic 
management. How does one manage a bankrupt economy while finding a source of income that 
would sustain it year after year? His answer came soon after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001, when the United States moved to set up operations in the small country. Before then, 
France had sustained Djibouti beginning in 1977 with rents for a military outpost established 
during the Ethio–Eritrean War. The French initially planned to leave after Djibouti gained its 
independence, but became nervous when it saw its former territory being challenged by Eritrea 
and Somalia. Thus, it decided to stay and now pays Djibouti about USD 34 million per year for 
rent, USD 10 million for local military spending, and about USD 25 million in economic aid.64 
Although this is not a large sum compared to other countries, due to Djibouti’s size, it is enough 
to keep the government comfortable. 
When Guelleh saw the amount of money he could gain through one patron, he went in 
search of others. After failed attempts at convincing Libya, Italy, and Iraq, he was successful in 
finding another wealthy benefactor in the form of the United States. After 11 September, the 
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United States was interested in finding a cheap and convenient location where it could station 
and deploy troops as well as create a staging area for counterterrorism operations to Somalia and 
Yemen. The United States signed the first contracts with Djibouti around 20 September 2001 and 
the first military leaders arrived a month later. Since then, the military presence and 
establishments have continued to increase and the militaries of Germany, Italy, and Spain joined 
France and the United States when pirates from Somalia started to threaten the global shipping 
industry.65 Japan arrived a few years later in 2011 and opened its first military base on foreign 
soil since World War II. 
U.S.-owned military base Camp Lemonnier is considered one of the largest bases in the 
area. It contains over four thousand U.S. military members and civilians and is not only a hub for 
counterterrorism operations, but also serves as a regional training center. Originally a French 
military camp, Camp Lemonnier was only ninety-seven acres and contained the most basic 
equipment for limited numbers of troops. Today, it has developed into a military powerhouse 
that holds the Combined Joint Task Force, a Voice of America transmitter, and the 150-member 
East Africa Response Force responsible for handling future threats to diplomatic personnel 
abroad.66 Nearby, U.S. Aid for International Development, which works closely with the U.S. 
Embassy and also in the same area, was later established in 2003.67 
Djibouti is also the regional hub for the U.S. military’s drone operations. Although 
Djibouti gives the U.S. permission to maintain and fly the drones, recent issues and accidents 
have created some serious air traffic problems, leading to tension between the Americans and 
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their resident host. In 2011, less than three miles from the airport, a Predator drone crashed into a 
suburban area. The following year, a fatal crash occurred five miles from Camp Lemonier 
involving a U-28A surveillance plane, which killed all four crew members. Under pressure from 
the Djibouti government, the drones were moved to a more isolated airstrip about six miles from 
Camp Lemonier, where they pose less of a danger to the local population. 
With several military outposts from different countries, Guelleh has the ability to play 
one base against the other in rents. When the United States came to Djibouti, Guelleh asked for 
an increase in rent from what the French had paid and the United States agreed. Because neither 
the French nor the United States could find time to negotiate together, France was in a difficult 
position because it was now paying significantly less than the United States, which Guelleh used 
to his advantage. He hounded the French mercilessly for an increase in their annual payments 
and finally, in 2003, they gave in and agreed, increasing their payment of USD 20 million a year 
to USD 34 million a year.68 The heavy support from the United States no doubt makes it difficult 
for other entities to work with the Government of the Republic of Djibouti (GoRD) because the 
GoRD is adept at leveraging one group against the other to obtain more money. 
When the United States initially signed the base agreements in 2001, it was unknown 
how long they would remain in Djibouti. Originally thought to be just a temporary solution, that 
idea eventually transformed due to the U.S. leader’s realization of the base’s strategic benefits. In 
2014, the Obama administration renewed its contract with Djibouti and signed a new twenty-year 
lease on the base, the only U.S. installation on the continent. In the past two years, the Pentagon 
invested nearly USD 1 billion to upgrade the camp and its surrounding facilities, making it more 
conducive to the Department of Defense’s vision of a major regional base supporting operations 
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throughout Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Indian Ocean. Not only does the lease renewal 
reinforce strategic ties between the two countries, but it also confirms their strategic partnership 
relations. Currently, the United States is paying Djibouti around USD 63 million a year for the 
installation’s rent, which is more than double the current leasing fees of other bases, due to the 
United States’ expanded military operations. The amount of money spent on construction 
projects and base rent alone signify Washington’s plans to stay in Djibouti for the long term. The 
base is in the process of increasing from eighty-eight acres to nearly five hundred acres.69 
Aside from the United States and France, Djibouti hosts and collects rents from the 
Italian and Japanese bases as well. Each base has a slightly different mission, depending on their 
country’s requirements. For example, the French have historical ties, the Americans focus on the 
fight against terrorism in the region, and the Japanese fight against piracy.70 In the Japanese’s 
case, their military base is critical because 10% of all Japanese-linked goods pass through these 
straits.71 
Now, in addition to Japan and the rest of the militaries, China has also entered the picture. 
Only a year after the United States signed their long-term lease agreement, China requested land 
to build a new military base and Djibouti subsequently agreed to this proposal. China is now 
building a military installation about eight miles from the U.S. and Japanese bases that will be 
China’s first military overseas outpost. However, not everyone shares Djibouti’s enthusiasm. The 
Japanese have reacted to this information by deciding to lease additional land to expand its 
																																																								
69 Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Signs New Lease to Keep Strategic Military Installation in the Horn of Africa.” New York 
Times, May 6, 2014. 
70 John Vandiver, “China Looks to Join US, France with Military Base in Djibouti.” McClatchy-Tribune Business 
News, May 12, 2015, http://www.stripes.com/news/africa/china-looks-to-join-us-france-with-military-base-in 
-djibouti-1.345715. 
71 Tim Mak, “Inside the Tiny Police State with Seven Armies,” The Daily Beast, 2016, 5 http://www.thedailybeast 
.com/longforms/2015/djibouti/inside-the-tiny-police-state-with-seven-armies.html. 
29 
military base as a counterweight to a growing Chinese influence in the area.72 Although the 
amount of rent the Japanese pay the Djiboutian government is unknown, the cost of the 
additional land is expected to be around USD 1 million extra per year.73 
In addition to China, the Saudi Arabians also recently announced that they too, plan to 
build a base in the same area.74 In January 2017, Djibouti finalized an agreement with Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia, which allows them to build a military base in the Horn of Africa to take a more 
assertive approach to regional security.75 This location is ideal for Riyadh’s mission of fighting 
Houthi rebels in Yemen as well as countering what it regards as Iranian interference in conflicts 
in the Arab world. Closer ties with Djibouti also coincide with attempts by Saudi Arabia to bring 
fellow Sunni nations into a grand alliance to project power, which would hopefully allow them to 
rely less on Western military backing. Additionally, because Djibouti is an Arab League member 
state, its ties to Saudi Arabia are connected by blood, culture, and faith, which makes its 
membership to the Saudi-led “Islamic coalition” against Iran-sponsored terror no surprise.76 The 
United Arab Emirates, a key ally in Riyadh’s campaign in Yemen, has already established a base 
in Eritrea that hosts attack helicopters, fast jets, drones, and naval vessels.77 Saudi Arabia, like 
China, is in a position to establish a regional presence. 
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Revenue from foreign military bases is an important form of income for Djibouti. When 
the economy was facing bankruptcy in 1999, Djibouti’s political leader found a way to alleviate 
the situation by using Djibouti’s strategic location. By offering land for rent, Djibouti’s president 
was able to make ongoing profit because other countries’ militaries were willing to pay for the 
location. From the United States’ (USD 63 million), China’s (USD 20 million), and France’s 
(USD 34 million) annual rents alone, the Guelleh administration is bringing in at least USD 117 
million in rent per year, which is just a fraction of the total yearly GDP. The other attribute that 
makes this piece of land so valuable is that it is ideally positioned near a waterway that runs from 
Europe to Asia and near the Middle East and its oil reserves. By overseas forces arranging 
themselves this close to the Middle East, Djibouti and overseas militaries are able to benefit. 
Overseas forces are able to protect their assets and project their presence while Djibouti gains 
continuous profit. 
Djibouti in the International Arena 
Since diplomatic ties between China and Djibouti were established on 8 January 1979, 
China’s relationship with Djibouti has made steady advancement.78 Bilateral trade between the 
two countries has already exceeded USD 200 billion to date in goods, which makes China the 
country’s largest single trade partner. 79  Djibouti’s top imports consist of food, fuel, and 
machinery; its top exports, while few, are sheep and goats, wood charcoal, and coffee. Since the 
first Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in 2000, Djibouti has received at least USD 16.6 
million in development finance from China alone and this number is continuing to grow. With 
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Djibouti setting its sights on expanding its current infrastructure, mainly its ports and airports, 
the government continually seeks an ever-increasing amount of money. China has provided and 
is currently providing the bulk of these finances in the form of nonconcessional or “hard” loans, 
but the International Monetary Fund warns against borrowing too much. However, with these 
loans comes risk. The International Monetary Fund cautions that high nonconcessional 
borrowing, which provides financial assistance on a market-based interest rate, is hurling 
Djibouti’s public and publicly guaranteed debt to a peak of 80% of GDP in 2017, up from 60.5% 
in 2014. This could be problematic in the future. 
In the past, China has supported antipiracy efforts by deploying warships around the 
Horn of Africa, but most of China’s attention is on its economic investments. Due to the 
historical role of China in assisting in the fight against piracy, the Chinese plan to use the ninety-
acre-plot naval base (which they refer to as a military outpost) as a platform to fight against 
pirates in neighboring Somalia, as well as a supply and logistics center for their fleet of ships, 
which are currently located at Djibouti Port. For Djibouti, this new addition is a welcome one, 
financially. China is contracted to pay Djibouti USD 20 million annually for ten years in base 
rents, with the option for ten more years when the first contract ends. The base will contain 
weapons stores, maintenance facilities, and possibly Chinese forces.80 These stores and facilities 
will help alleviate resupply and food issues that China encountered in its 2008 antipiracy patrols. 
In addition to the paying Djibouti rent, the Chinese also offer Djibouti the proximity of an 
additional strategic ally. Although Guelleh feels this arrangement is strategically beneficial for 
Djibouti, the United States sees it as a potential threat.81 
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Because this would be China’s first military base in Africa, the United States is 
suspicious of China’s actual intent. Some Americans believe that China’s intensifying interest in 
Djibouti is shifting the balance of U.S. influence; others argue that the fight against piracy 
(China’s original mission in Djibouti) is declining and because fewer acts have taken place these 
past five years, the reasoning for a permanent base is illogical. This base also presents difficulties 
for the United States because in the past, Djibouti denied Russia’s request for a permanent base 
due to the tense relationship between the United States and Russia and continues to deny Russia 
now. Djibouti claimed that its relationship with the United States was more vital and that they 
did not want to “become the terrain for a proxy war.”82 However; now that Djibouti has accepted 
China’s offer, knowing the contentious relationship between China and the United States makes 
the United States consider the nature of its alliance with Djibouti, and what would happen if 
Djibouti had to choose between the two countries. The. United States especially worries about its 
sensitive defense technology, which, if compromised by the Chinese through hacking, would 
have to be removed. This would leave the United States in a precarious position and could alter 
its role in its regional fight against terrorism.83 
The United States’ concern about China has merit. China has been known to strategically 
plan for its expansion by carrying out a series of “test cases” to see whether they are able to 
successfully achieve their goals on a smaller scale. This may be one of those cases in which 
China is experimenting before enlarging their footprint in Africa. “It is a foreign trade and 
investment strategy known as ‘one belt, one road,’” says Alexander Neil, a senior fellow at the 
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Institute for Strategic Studies Asia,84 referencing the possibility of setting land and maritime 
trade routes, which is a version of the historic Silk Road. This was also justified by Chinese 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s verbiage, in which he acknowledged the need to “try out the 
construction of some infrastructure facilities and support abilities”85 when questioned whether 
China plans to establish more military bases after Djibouti. By experimenting with one project 
before committing to others allows China to refine plans, be more cost efficient, and identify the 
specific types of qualities and goods needed to be 100% effective in achieving their goals. 
Establishing China’s first overseas base in Africa not only grants China access to the Arabian 
Peninsula but also allows the Chinese to observe how African governments react to their 
presence, since they clearly want to emphasize that they are different from other powers in 
Africa. 
This shift of China’s presence in Africa is also seen as China bringing in their “excess 
capacity to build infrastructure, to provide soft loans, interest-free loans and to stimulate business 
interests in Africa with Chinese partners, whereas China’s approach preciously was more 
extractive.”86 China’s launch to Djibouti could also simply signal an era of increased Chinese 
military engagement around the world. Establishing a “prebase” is the first step in the 
establishment of a greater military presence. Recently, China has confirmed its intention to 
establish more bases after the facility in Djibouti is completed. China’s rationale for establishing 
these bases is the need to protect its expanding overseas interests as well as its stakes in Middle 
Eastern oil fields and its increasing number of Chinese expatriates. This is crucial because 
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approximately half of China’s oil imports pass through the nearby Gulf of Aden.87 Additionally, 
Chinese military presence could continue to establish the Chinese president’s image as a strong 
world leader. 
However, China is not the only entity benefiting from this arrangement. In addition to the 
increased rent Djibouti’s government is positioned to receive, having China in the country will 
raise Djibouti’s caliber as a global player in the shipping sector and secure its beneficial 
relationship with the world’s second-largest economy. In essence, Djibouti’s credentials increase 
dramatically as they become known as a regional logistics hub for foreign militaries. 
Additionally, the establishment of a Chinese naval facility is seen as an endorsement of their 
success.88 
China is a crucial player in determining future U.S.–Djibouti relations. With China 
developing closer ties with Djibouti through aid, grants, and loans, Djibouti is beholden to China 
now more than ever before. Djibouti sees the arrangement as mutually beneficial. Djibouti 
receives an increase in rent money, which benefits the neopatrimonial government and their 
endless desire to obtain further profit, while China gets access and close proximity to the Middle 
Eastern oil fields and the nearby Gulf of Aden. However, the United States sees it as a possible 
threat. U.S.–Djibouti relations are currently strong, yet U.S.–China relations are not, making U.S. 
concerns about China valid. 
																																																								
87 Page, “China Builds First Overseas Military Outpost,” 5. 
88 Morgan Winsor, “With China’s Naval Base, Djibouti Could Become ‘Africa’s Singapore.’” International 
Business Times, 4 February 2016, sec. World, http://www.ibtimes.com/chinas-naval-base-djibouti-could-become 
-africas-singapore-2292581. 
35 
The Djibouti Government in the Domestic Arena 
Previously, this thesis explained how Djibouti’s neopatrimonial government and its 
function as a rentier state sustain the country despite minimal natural resources. By using its 
strategic location, Djibouti sustains its GDP through three principal areas in its economy: the 
international Port of Djibouti, rents from military bases, and the Djibouti–Ethiopia relationship. 
From these three areas come rents, which, as previously discussed, go directly to the government. 
The political leader then decides where these rents are best used, even if that includes using them 
for his own personal interests. As a result of this arrangement, Djibouti has inherited several 
challenges that in return, affect its economy. These challenges will be discussed in three 
subsections: public challenges, political challenges, and economic challenges. 
Public Challenges 
One main challenge that falls in this category is Djibouti’s poverty rate. The country’s 
poverty rate has increased over the past five years, specifically between 2012–2013, most likely 
as a result of the president using government funding for his own personal interests. Upon 
researching several sources, specific, documented numbers were hard to find; yet trends show 
that the number of people living at the national poverty line actually increased from 2012 to 2013. 
In 2012, 18.3% of the population was living on less than USD 1.90 a day and 37% were living 
on under USD 3.10 per day. In 2013, approximately 22.5% of the population was living under 
USD 1.90 a day with 43.1% of the population living on less than USD 3.10 per day.89 No 
numbers were updated for the past four years. 
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Poverty rates taken from the Country Partnership Strategy for the Republic of Djibouti 
FY2014–2017 differ. These numbers show that poverty in Djibouti is actually much higher. This 
report states that in 2012, 41.9% of the population was in absolute poverty and 79.4% of the 
population was in relative poverty.90 Outside of the capital, poverty rates become more visible. 
Seven of ten Djiboutians fall below the absolute poverty line and nine of ten under the relative 
poverty line. 91  With researched numbers fluctuating from 43% of the population living in 
extreme poverty up to 70%, the actuality of the poverty rate being significantly higher is quite 
probable. Although the reasons behind rising poverty rates are unclear, this research ultimately 
suggests that the low-income population is not benefiting from the lucrative rents or from the 
high economic growth. As a result, Djibouti is ranked near the bottom on two major poverty-
league tables. In the International Food Policy Research’s 2012 Global Hunger Index, Djibouti 
ranks sixty-second of seventy-nine countries, and in the UN Development Programme’s Hunger 
Index, it ranks 165 of 187. 92  Additionally, due to lack of governmental transparency and 
corruption, poverty rates remain estimated and undisclosed. 
Khat, a leafy plant banned in the United States but revered as a stimulant in the Horn of 
Africa, is another challenge hanging over the Djiboutian people. Due to the intense heat, the 
workday starts and ends early, which leaves a large portion of the day open. In most cases, this 
time period is filled with the local people chewing khat. Locals and foreigners alike say khat is 
responsible for tranquilizing the country’s youth, which ultimately benefits the police state. By 
sedating the society’s young people, the chance of democratic or revolutionary movements are 
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unlikely. As one port worker was quoted by Katrina Manson of The Financial Times, “If 
Djiboutians stopped chewing khat for seven days, they would overthrow the government.”93 He 
was only half joking. Some opponents of GoRD go so far as to accuse government officials of 
using khat as a way of repressing society. Because those close to the government facilitate the 
sale of khat in the country, officials are able to make the population stay busy if the need 
arises—eight hours of being high, followed by eight hours of sleep.94 
Ethnic diversity also plays a role in the political economy. Related to the earlier 
discussion of historic ethnic tensions, the diversity of the population is also severely 
underrepresented due to the majority of the cabinet and inner circle being from the Issa 
population, which is the president’s ethnic clan. Thus, the Afar and other regional ethnic groups 
are not given a voice at a level where they could potentially have some influence. 
The next issue is the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate for young people under 
the age of thirty is around 70% with the overall unemployment rate hovering around 60%.95 
Although Djibouti’s economy is growing, so too is its unemployment rates. Information provided 
by Djibouti’s Ministry of Defense in 2002 showed that Djibouti’s unemployment rate was at a 
staggering 59.5% high, but seven years later in 2009, it decreased to 54%, suggesting some 
improvement.96 
Unemployment in Djibouti is high for several reasons. Not enough jobs are created. Due 
to the high level of economic growth being extremely labor intensive, jobs are at a premium and 
usually go to workers brought in from the country that won the contract. Many of these contracts 
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are won by the Chinese. In most cases, the Djiboutian government does not object because the 
projects being completed are done at much lower cost. The cost of labor (compared to worker 
productivity) is another reason unemployment numbers are so high. The influx of rents leads to a 
high cost of living, which results in a lack of worker competitiveness. Taxes and social 
contributions drive up costs even further. A recent report developed by collaboration of the 
Djiboutian government and the World Bank showed that unemployment has actually increased to 
60% and 70% with no possible substantial decrease until around 2020. As Mehdi Benyagoub 
writes, “even in the most optimistic scenario, unemployment could only be brought below 50% 
by around 2020.”97 If this were to happen, considerable changes would need to take place, 
primarily doubling the annual rate of job creation, which currently is not feasible. 
For individuals who are able to obtain an education in Djibouti, the scarcity of jobs 
creates “brain waste” of local residents, such that the country has more qualified individuals than 
available jobs. Additionally, schools are not geared toward the economy’s needs for technicians, 
supervisors, and employees. No technical programs are available for this line of work, and for 
the majority of major economic developments, international supervisors are brought in to fulfill 
those positions.98 English is also a contributing factor. In Djibouti, English is not a required 
subject in public schools and although English is offered in private schools, only the wealthiest 
families in the country are able to afford to send their children. In most cases, individuals grow 
up learning French or Arabic as their official language as well as their local language. This can 
be problematic in an environment with a growing influx of international business companies and 
English speakers. 
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Although no public English programs are available, some entities offer programs or 
opportunities for a small number of individuals to learn English at no cost. For example, the 
International Foundation for Education and Self-Help received a grant from USAID to establish 
and maintain a Teachers for Africa Program in Djibouti. This program selected and placed 
several teachers and English-language training experts in various positions in the Ministry of 
Education as well as the private sector to promote the development of English.99 These teachers 
learned how to be English educators and went on to teach others what they learned. 
Another program worth noting is the Institute of Diplomatic Studies English Program. 
This program is facilitated through Camp Lemonnier, government funded, and available to 
Djiboutian civil servants from the region who want to expand their understanding of the English 
language. The program meets three days a week and gives local Djiboutians the opportunity to 
learn English at no cost, while interacting with military volunteers from Camp Lemonier.100 
Poverty rates and unemployment rates continue to plague the country. Instead of 
decreasing, as one would expect due to the heightened amount of money entering the economy, 
these rates have actually increased, despite modern growth in the country’s economy. Additional 
challenges consist of a surplus of khat, ethnic diversity, lack of English schools, and no technical 
schools geared toward the economy’s needs. 
Political Challenges 
Power is extremely centralized in Djibouti, with decisions not being of the people, but all 
determined around the President. He decides all laws and decrees and even other government 
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branches have little input about what is to be decided. Rule of law is absent and very few 
individuals in the different government branches have changed since Djibouti’s current president 
came into office in 1999. Djiboutian officials do not understand that “decentralization does not 
take power away from the central government authorities (Ministries) and politicians as much as 
it strengthens the entire government structure to operate in a more functional manner—
increasing productivity and stability that will create a critical mass for local economic 
development and a magnet for potential foreign investment.”101 Although many decentralization 
attempts have taken place, few actual changes have yet to be seen. 
Djiboutian elections also demonstrate Djibouti’s participation in a neopatrimonial 
government as well as clarifies President Guelleh’s role as the political leader. However, his role 
can be argued to be more dictator-like rather than that of a democratic president. Although 
Djibouti holds elections every six years, it has not had a change in political parties since it 
officially allowed opposition groups to run in 1992. Additionally, if there were any opposition 
groups wanting to run against the People’s Rally for Progress, they are extremely limited at 
getting the word out to the local population since the election season, by law, is limited to only 
two weeks before the first votes are cast. Even when upcoming elections were taking place in 
April 2016, the Rally for Progress, under President Guelleh, was again expected to win.102 And 
as expected, President Guelleh was elected to a fourth term by around 187,000 people, or about 
20% of the population who were deemed eligible to vote.103 President Guelleh came into power 
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in 1999 when he replaced his uncle to become the second president since Djibouti’s 
independence. Originally, the constitution limited a president’s time in office to two terms, but 
when Guelleh decided he wanted to stay in office, he changed the constitution’s term limits to 
allow for a third term. That election was boycotted by opposition leaders, but Guelleh remained 
in power. 
The United States urged Djibouti to work with opposition groups to find a peaceful 
solution for this year’s elections, but based on historical trends and Guelleh’s determination to 
stay in power, this year’s elections still did not include any opposition party candidates.104 This is 
because the number of electoral laws, policies, and fees make any opposition win outside of the 
current ruling party impossible. Another opposition group has even yet to win a seat in the sixty-
five-member National Assembly in any legislative election since 1992. Moreover, if a losing 
candidate wants to contest a presidential election, the candidate must raise USD 28,500, which is 
an extraordinary fee for most individuals. This law is further exacerbated by constant and 
continued harassment of opposition electoral candidates. 
One oppositional candidate who was thought to be a possible contender during this year’s 
election was Abdourahman Boreh, who currently lives in London. Boreh, a former close ally of 
Guelleh’s who was responsible for managing the country’s successful free-trade zone and port, 
was forced to flee to London when he was threatened with arrest for opposing Guelleh’s plan to 
seek a third term.105 Boreh, who was also accused of corruption charges by Guelleh, had his case 
thrown out of court by a British judge and is overtly calling for change in all aspects of Djibouti 
through a website called The Djibouti Plan. Although the chance of Boreh returning to Djibouti 
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is slim, Boreh continues to propose change through his website and advocates the rights of the 
Djiboutian population.106 Guelleh is also insulated from domestic pressures by international rents. 
Because money is paid directly to the government, local citizens have no accountability 
mechanisms or any way to get between or interrupt these flows. When a U.S. government 
official working in Djibouti was asked where the money goes, his response was rueful. He stated, 
“there is little visibility to where the money goes or how it is used. Once the money comes from 
the Ministry of Budget, the recipients have the freedom to spend the money however they 
choose.”107 
In President Guelleh’s neopatrimonial government, Guelleh uses corruption to run his 
government as a dictatorship. According to Transparency International, Djibouti was given a 
score of thirty of one hundred on the corruption scale with 0 being highly corrupt and 100 being 
very clean.108 Compared to every other country, Djibouti ranked 123 of 176 and has seen a 
decrease in its corruption-perception score by six points since 2012,109 indicating a higher level 
of corruption now than in 2012. Weber stated, “For the political administration is treated as a 
purely personal affair of the ruler, and the political power is considered part of his personal 
property.”110  This can be seen in Guelleh’s government. Political leaders in neopatrimonial 
governments have more to gain if they are in control, which makes the use of corruption more 
appealing. They are able to take greater sums of money and become the sole decision maker over 
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most governmental matters. This in return makes the pressure to control the government all the 
greater. 
President Guelleh’s role as a dictator can be seen in that no opposition party has ever won 
an election, much less a seat in the sixty-five-member National Assembly. Additionally, 
President Guelleh’s ability to oust his one serious presidential contender to such a degree that he 
is unable to return to his country is another example of his role as a dictator. Last, the GoRD 
maintains control by limiting the number of Internet and phone providers. At the moment, 
Djibouti only contains one government-run phone and Internet provider, which are both 
extensively monitored. By blocking websites and cutting phone lines, the GoRD has shown it 
will go to many lengths to maintain its power. Additionally, as with other countries in the region, 
Djibouti’s human rights abuses are appalling. The United Nation’s International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights sites some of the areas of concern: violence and discrimination against 
women, torture and ill-treatment, threats and intimidation against human rights defenders and 
journalists, and human trafficking, to name a few.111 
Djibouti has a plethora of political challenges. In addition to running the country using a 
neopatrimonial government, using rentierism to collect its income, personal freedoms and rule of 
law are almost nonexistent. President Guelleh rules the country using a dictator-type manner 
coupled with corrupt practices, which makes change hard to achieve. This method of rule allows 
him to maintain control with little opposition; but in doing so, corruption in Djibouti is 
increasing, as seen in the aforementioned research. Additionally, by centralizing Internet and 
phone companies, Guelleh ensures citizens are limited in what information they can obtain, 
alleviating the possibility of potential upheavals. 
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Economic Challenges 
Djibouti currently faces many challenges outside the port and base sectors in maintaining 
economic growth. Between 2000 and 2012, Djibouti’s economy grew at an average of 4.8% 
annually, peaking at nearly 6% in 2008.112 Today, Djibouti’s growth forecast for 2017–2018 is 
expected to reach 7% on average, resulting from the expectation of higher revenues, government 
reforms, and lowered government spending.113 Djibouti has a current GDP of roughly USD 1.9 
billion up from USD 1.59 billion in 2014 with an economy dominated by a service sector that 
includes transport, communications, commerce, and tourism.114 This sector, which also includes 
rent from the varying military bases, contributes more than 80% of Djibouti’s GDP. The primary 
sector, which includes agriculture and fisheries, contributes 3%, whereas the remaining 17% is 
found in the industrial and manufacturing sectors. 115  However, most of the foreign direct 
investment goes toward the service sector for activities like roads, buildings, hotels, and port 
infrastructure, with foreign-direct-investment inflows and port financing limited categories that 
are not long-term solutions. 
One challenge to attaining economic growth is corruption. This growth is managed by 
Djiboutian governmental leaders, who focus on maintaining control of the country. To maintain 
this type of dependence, income is limited and distributed to the controlling elite while being 
withheld from the local population. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler offer one explanation of the 
source of looted resource rents as when government rulers have a fixed and identifiable support 
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group.116 In this case, President Guelleh’s fellow Issas hold the most privileged government 
positions. The smaller the ruling ethnic group, the more damaging to economic growth. Another 
explanation of governmental looting is due to the valuable consistency of public assets compared 
to societal income. In Djibouti’s case, with little societal income, revenue accrues through 
consistent rents and other international resources, thereby removing the need to develop an 
economy that actively includes its residents. This system allows the government to retain total 
control without the risk of confrontational interactions. As author Jennifer N. Brass writes, “an 
undiversified economy and uneducated populace make it unlikely that an organized opposition 
will pose a significant threat.”117 
Other issues that play into Djibouti’s low economy are its weak private sector, weak trade 
freedom, lack of property rights, and corruption. Currently, only 141 small businesses exist, and 
they only offer short-term opportunities or government contracts. According to the Index of 
Economic Freedom, Djibouti ranks 171 out of 180 and has a score of 46.7, which is categorized 
as “repressed.”118 This score is a result of Djibouti’s institutional weakness in areas such as poor 
governance, lack of a sound judicial framework, and corruption, which ultimately raises the cost 
of doing business. 
It is also extremely hard to establish a private business in Djibouti due to the regulations 
and tax burdens that many low-income business owners face. Another major challenge 
Djiboutians face is the lack of access to credit. In Djibouti, local citizens have no way to obtain 
or access credit. If a Djiboutian citizen wants to start a business, they must have the capital prior 
to getting started. In most cases, this is impossible. Although Djibouti has made strides in its 
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private-business sector, the World Bank’s 2015 Doing Business report ranks Djibouti 155 out of 
189 countries in how uncomplicated it is to start a small business.119 
This difficulty is compounded by the cost of electricity. The cost of electricity in Djibouti 
is extremely high: third highest in the world at USD 0.32/kilowatt hour (kWh). Djibouti has to 
import all its fuel and currently pays Ethiopia USD 1.8 million per month to supply it with most 
of its electricity.120 Presently, per capita annual electricity consumption in Djibouti is about 330 
kWh compared to an African average of over 575 kWh and a global average of over 2,770 kWh. 
Thus, the average Djiboutian citizen is among the lowest consumers of electricity in the world.121 
Due to lack of affordable or accessible electricity, Djiboutian households heavily depend on 
kerosene and traditional biomass to meet their basic energy needs. 
Another major problem is that a significant portion of electricity generation is powered 
by petroleum imports. This is a challenge because petroleum imports use up significant 
proportions of Djibouti’s foreign exchange.122 However, Djibouti has plans to establish a second 
power line to eventually draw 100% of its electricity need from Ethiopia, but with this power 
being reserved as backup, which means that a significant percentage of the Djiboutian population 
would still be without energy.123 
As mentioned above, the Djiboutian government and political environment are a 
significant reason the economy is not at its best. Djibouti maintains a government that is 
considerably authoritarian to maintain a high-level of control over all its assets. Because Djibouti 
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obtains the majority of its revenues from outside sources, it is not dependent on it citizen’s 
revenue, which generally comes through the form of taxes. This issue can include state revenue 
collection such as taxes not collected, exemptions granted, tariffs adverted, licenses bribed away, 
and parking fines pocketed, that is, any money that is intended for the state but never 
materializes. In a normal governor–governed relationship, the state depends on its citizens for 
revenue, which, as previously mentioned, is usually obtained through taxation. When citizens are 
taxed, they are afford rights and responsibilities to the state and vice versa, which keeps both 
entities accountable to each other.124 However, because the government does not rely on its 
citizens for income, no legal recourse is given to culprits who use the system for their own 
advantage, and government accountability is nonexistent. This system leaves a government that 
has a form of highly consolidated power, repressive tactics, and no desire to interact with its 
people. As discussed in Chapter 1, these are common traits found in neopatrimonial societies. 
Yet author Thandika Mkandawire disagrees. 
Because neopatrimonial societies are associated with governments that do not tax their 
citizens, Mkandawire claims otherwise. She states that neopatrimonial societies do tax their 
citizens (thereby ensuring the governor–governed relationship) and that African countries 
(including Djibouti) actually collect a higher percentage of taxes than other developing countries 
and collect more than the International Monetary Fund recommended minimum of 15% of 
GDP.125 Djibouti does indeed tax 17% of an individual’s profit.126 
Although Mkandawire’s information is informative and accurate, the difference between 
her argument and Djibouti is that Djibouti has a taxation system and implements it, but does not 
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need it. The country is able to mishandle the system because they have other means of income 
that make these lesser forms of income seem paltry. If a government individual were to take a 
monetary bribe to alter a previously decided piece of agenda, nothing would be said because the 
funds do not affect the overall scheme. 
Djibouti faces continuous challenges in establishing private businesses and accessing 
credit. Its energy system is also a major burden to the economic and social sector as well as 
being unsustainable. By continuing to import its electricity, Djibouti uses valuable financial 
resources that could otherwise be spent on its people and their social development. However, 
with Djibouti’s many challenges comes much potential. One area of potential is in Djibouti’s 
lesser known renewable resources. Last, the Djiboutian government and political environment 
are also problematic. With finances going directly to the government in a neopatrimonial setup, 
accountability to Djiboutian citizens is waning. 
Potential in a Geostrategic Location 
In addition to its location, Djibouti has renewable sources it could use to render the 
country more economically stable as well as more independent of others. First, as already 
discussed, Djibouti has a shipping lane that is far busier than Dubai’s and will continue to 
become busier as surrounding economies continue to develop. Second, Djibouti is surrounded by 
several landlocked countries like Sudan and Ethiopia that are desperate for a gateway to the 
wider world. And with Somalia and Eritrea having no formidable working relationship with 
these countries, Djibouti can step in and offer its services, for a price. Third, Djibouti has a 
digital infrastructure that continues to develop with time. Fourth, it has wind and solar power. 
Several feasibility studies have demonstrated that Djibouti is home to vast amounts of wind and 
solar power potential and with the right forms of investment, these two resources alone could 
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save Djibouti a great deal of money. Last, the country has large resources of geothermal energy it 
can use. 
At the moment, Djibouti has six submarine cable systems that currently land in Djibouti 
with three more planned for implementation in 2016–2017. The Djibouti Data Center (DDC), 
established in 2013, leverages Djibouti’s strategic position as a major meeting point in east 
Africa for undersea fiber-optic-cable systems connecting Europe, the Middle East, and Asia to 
Africa. The DDC, a joint-venture partnership with Djibouti Telecom, offers international 
telecommunications carriers and mobile-network operators the opportunity to establish services 
in Africa at an inexpensive and affordable cost. Additionally, the DDC plans to expand to 
neighboring east African countries to establish smaller data centers. This development will allow 
those subsequent centers to access the submarine cables off Djibouti through its main data 
center.127 Due to investments made by the DDC and Djibouti Telecom, Djibouti Telecom is now 
the leading strategic hub for international telecommunications services in east Africa.128 
Aside from its location and digital infrastructure, Djibouti also has wind and solar power 
energy that is to be further developed as a part of a countrywide plan Djibouti initiated in 2014. 
Known as Vision 2035, the plan focuses on all social and economic aspects including education, 
tourism, logistics, and energy, to strengthen the country’s human capital, develop its private 
sector, and reform its systems of governance.129 The plan, drafted with the help of the World 
Bank, envisions Djibouti becoming a middle-class country in two decades. 
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In 2013, Djibouti assessed the feasibility of a 60 MW wind power plant near Lake Assal, 
and is now building the country’s first industrial-scale wind-power facility. China’s Shanghai 
Electric has signed a Memorandum of Agreement with Djibouti’s minister of energy and the 
Chinese company is constructing the wind farm in two parts of 30 MW each. Djibouti’s wind 
potential is great and, as previously estimated in the 2013 assessment, Djibouti has the potential 
to generate up to five thousand kWh annually.130 With high energy demands and Djibouti’s 
needs to fund multiple port projects, Djibouti is looking for ways to lower energy costs while 
also attracting more investors. Djibouti’s target goal is to become the first African country to be 
powered solely by renewable resources and 100% clean energy by 2020.131 
Solar power is another possible renewable energy source. Recently, the country has 
announced plans for a new large-scale solar power project to be developed by Switzerland’s 
Green Enesys, that will source 100% of its energy from renewable sources.132 The plant, which 
will be located in Grand Bara desert, may be among the largest solar-power projects in Africa, 
once commissioned. The project will be set up in six phases of 50 MW capacity each and, as of 
now, has no completion date in sight. The project is financed through a Programme Partnership 
Arrangement and is valued at around USD 390 million.133 
Part of Djibouti’s 2020 strategy includes geothermal development. The country has 
incredible potential with its twelve geothermal reserve sites. By generating power through 
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thermal steam found in these underground lava lakes, Djibouti could significantly cut electricity 
costs by producing about one thousand MW of energy.134 With hopes of benefiting from the 
potential resource, Djibouti has established a Ministry of Energy for Natural Resources and the 
Djibouti Office for Geothermal Energy Development.135 
Currently, Office for Geothermal Energy Development’s sole role includes working with 
other countries and international organizations to develop geothermal-related projects as well as 
to create sustainable geothermal energy in Djibouti. One major ongoing project is the 
Geothermal Exploration Project in the Lake Assal region, one area where lava has been found 
underground. This project is part of a geothermal-energy development program aimed at 
improving the Djiboutian population’s quality of life by increasing access to electricity. The 
project is taking place in several different phases, funded by several international organizations 
including the World Bank. Djibouti already imports two-thirds of its electricity from Ethiopia 
and in 2014, total electricity consumption reached 108 MW with the expectation of 4.5% growth 
annually over the next decade.136 By completing this project, Djibouti will be significantly less 
dependent on Ethiopia for electricity, helping the country meet almost all of its own electricity 
demands.137 New projects between the two countries are continuing to develop with hopes of 
reducing half of Djibouti’s dependency on fossil fuels by 2018. 
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Last, tourism in Djibouti is positioned to play a key role in the Vision 2035 plan. 
According to the plan, Djibouti intends to attract more than half a million visitors by 2030 with 
attractions such as sandy beaches along the Red Sea, salt lakes, volcanic fields, underwater 
diving sites, and national parks.138 Working to attract tourists, the National Tourism Office of 
Djibouti has developed marketing slogans such as “Djibeauty” to highlight the country’s raw 
scenery and “Ethiopia’s beach” to draw tourism from Ethiopia. However only 10% of the 
country’s tourism potential has been exploited, due to three factors: high-priced tickets from 
large tourism-source markets, regional instability, and lack of facilities.139 Djibouti also has the 
issue of high temperatures. Consequently, tourism is limited to the months of November and 
December. 
Yet even with these challenges, Djibouti is determined to try, and has set the goal of 
attracting five hundred thousand visitors each year by 2030 and generating up to thirty thousand 
direct jobs. 140  To accomplish this, the country is working to increase its infrastructure by 
building several high-end facilities that include various hotels, malls, and two new airports.141 
The country is also working to fix and upgrade domestic transportation as well as set up local 
tourism training opportunities that allow them to forgo the costly foreign experts that are 
normally required to start these operations. As stated by Houssein Mahamoud Robleh, director-
general of the Kamaj Investment Company, “There are opportunities for local tourism, meaning 
tourism by Djiboutians in their own country. What is needed is more infrastructure, roads and 
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hotels, and creating a two-day weekend that will stimulate internal travel.”142 If Djibouti can 
manage to further develop and polish several of its infrastructure issues, the country is poised to 
become a regional tourism destination. 
Djibouti has the potential to run its country on renewable resources. In addition to using 
its port as a strategic resource, it has found several other areas in which it can invest such as the 
tourism sector. Renewable resources and tourism would give Djibouti the money and energy 
needed to move from a using a neopatrimonial government system to a fair democratic economy. 
Finding alternative renewable resources also permits the country to save money, otherwise spent 
on expensive import and export costs that would ideally flow down to low-income populations, 
thereby increasing Djiboutian citizens’ well-being. 
“It’s interesting,” says Ali Yacoub Mahamoud, the minister of energy and natural 
resources. “In the colonial period, everything in Djibouti was viewed negatively. They all said 
we only had a hot sun, dry winds and a lot of rocks. Nothing valuable. Even the nomads felt that 
way. But now the negatives are positives.”143 
																																																								
142 Ibid., 5. 
143 Reel, “Djibouti Is Hot,” 17. 
54 
Chapter Four: Conclusion 
To return to the research question I posed at the beginning of this study; how does the 
neopatrimonial government of Djibouti sustain the country in the absence of natural resources? 
The country’s strategic location makes it possible for the neopatrimonial government to sustain 
itself as a rentier state despite other natural resources like natural gas or oil. The neopatrimonial 
government of Djibouti is able to survive through the collection of rents from military bases and 
port fees. Consequently, Djibouti has registered an average of 5% GDP growth for the last five 
years and anticipates maintaining that same growth rate in the years to come.144 However, even 
though the government of Djibouti has a steady flow of income that does not seem to be ending 
any time soon, because of neopatrimonialism, the money that does enter the economy does not 
spill down to the lowest levels and has adversely affected the local economy, leaving the 
majority of the people in poverty. Three main examples of this trend are increases in the 
unemployment and poverty rates and Djibouti’s corruption score. 
Answers to two research questions provide greater insight into this situation. The first 
question raised in this paper was how Djibouti’s favorable geostrategic location affected the 
development of the political and economic sectors. The international Port of Djibouti is just one 
example of how its strategic location affects the country’s development. By upgrading the port 
and enlarging its capabilities, Djibouti is able to accommodate more customers and earn more 
revenue as a rentier state. In addition to the recent upgrades, Djibouti’s port is considered a 
strategic location to other countries because it is situated in the middle of a highly used shipping 
lane that connects Europe to Asia. Because of its location, the likelihood of this waterway 
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diminishing in importance is unlikely. Djibouti’s government knows this and uses it to their 
advantage by trying to service as many vessels as it can. 
Djibouti and Ethiopia have a unique relationship that ensures cooperation. Djibouti needs 
Ethiopia to maintain continuous imports and exports to ensure a consistent flow of port 
transportation fees. This constant influx of income then goes directly to the government, used at 
the political leader’s discretion. Ethiopia, in contrast, needs Djibouti for their water access to 
arrange shipment of any international goods and to access other potential markets. Although 
challenges and difficulties preside, this arrangement demonstrates one more way Djibouti’s 
strategic location affects the country’s economic development. However, this arrangement and 
Djibouti’s steady income could easily change. If Ethiopia and Somalia can work out their 
differences, ultimately it could allow Ethiopia to find better import/export rates in another 
country, which would permit them to move from Djibouti entirely. At present, with DP World 
now under contract to develop the Berbera port in Somaliland, it is possible that the Djiboutian 
economy will slow. This is even more likely if Ethiopia is able to move most or all of its 
imports/exports to the proposed port. 
GDP decline could result from the competition that forms between Somaliland and 
Djibouti. If Djibouti faces competition from this port in the future, it could ultimately benefit 
Ethiopia by permitting them to choose the best offer between the two competing countries. 
Nonetheless, Djibouti has done well in building and improving their infrastructure. Given the 
abovementioned investments and increased infrastructure, Djibouti has created a greater cost and 
capacity advantage over regional competitors and although at times contentious, cooperation 
56 
between Djibouti and Ethiopia has boosted both economies by paving the way for regional 
economic dependence.145 
Revenue from foreign military bases is also an important form of income for Djibouti. 
When the economy was facing bankruptcy, President Guelleh found a way to alleviate the 
situation through Djibouti’s strategic location. By offering land for rent, Djibouti’s president was 
able to make ongoing profit because other countries’ militaries were willing to pay for its 
location. The profit from the United States, China, and France alone equals USD 117 million in 
base rental income and this is only around a fraction of Djibouti’s yearly GDP. Additional value 
is found in Djibouti’s location, ideally positioned near a waterway that runs from Europe to Asia 
and that is also near the Middle East and its oil reserves. By arranging themselves this close to 
the Middle East, these overseas militaries are able to protect their assets and project their 
presence to others. Djibouti benefits from this by playing one military against the other in an 
effort to receive bigger financial gain. If one country declines to pay more rent, Djibouti is 
unfazed, because due to their much-sought location and would be able to quickly find a 
replacement. 
The largest overseas base and, subsequently, largest payer of rent at USD 63 million is 
U.S. Camp Lemonnier. This base is strategically important to the United States, which is why the 
United States pays so much money to the Djiboutian government for its location. Despite 
concerns as to whether the base will be leaving Djibouti in the next couple years, based on the 
most recent lease renewal and the amount of money Djibouti continuously receives from the 
United States in rent, that idea is unlikely. Aside from the United States, Djibouti and its 
neopatrimonial government uses rentierism to host military bases from several other countries as 
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well, each with different objectives. Each base pays compensation for the land it uses, thereby 
solidifying Djibouti’s position as a rentier state. Although most bases are amiable to each other, 
one country in particular gives the U.S. concern: China. 
China is a crucial player in U.S.–Djibouti relations. With China developing closer ties 
with Djibouti through aid, grants, and loans, Djibouti is beholden to China now more than ever. 
Djibouti sees the arrangement as mutually beneficial. Djibouti receives an increase in rent money 
(China pays USD 20 million in rent annually), which benefits Guelleh’s neopatrimonial 
government and its endless desire to obtain further profit, and China gets access and close 
proximity to the Middle Eastern oil fields and the nearby Gulf of Aden. However, the United 
States sees the Chinese base as a possible threat. U.S.–Djibouti relations are currently strong, yet 
U.S.–China relations are not, making concerns about China valid. If a conflict should arise 
between the United States and China, it is possible that Djibouti would side with China, based on 
the amount of monetary support it receives from China. If Chinese relations with Djibouti 
continue to grow and China maintains their massive investments, then due to their contributions 
alone, Djibouti, its government, and President Guelleh have no reason to give up the use of their 
neopatrimonial system. This would prevent any type of economic or political advancement and 
only prolong the use of the neopatrimonial system in Djibouti. 
China is an unknown player in this equation. If Chinese relations with Djibouti continue 
to grow and China maintains their massive investments, then due to their contributions alone, 
Djibouti would not see any gain in transitioning to a fair, democratic government. Money would 
continue to enter the country and President Guelleh would continue to feel complacent as the 
money’s receiver. This would allow him to continue to avoid addressing his denizens and their 
well-being. A new Chinese naval facility would provide hundreds of jobs if China decides to 
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recruit locally. However, although the base’s construction might support a local community, it is 
well known that in most cases, China brings in its own workers to do the job to limit training and 
housing costs. 
The second question asked how the neopatrimonial government had used rentierism to its 
advantage. This paper considered the roots of neopatrimonialism in Djibouti. Originally 
developing from the patrimonial system of peasants and patrons, neopatrimonialism came from a 
system in which both sides gained something in return. As Beekers and van Gool stated, 
“patronage was not a developmental stage, but rather a principle of interpersonal 
relationships.” 146  However, that changed as newer hierarchies evolved. With change, these 
relationships were no longer needed and instead of being a system of balance, the system 
changed to be more one-sided. Patrons became more powerful than their clients and the system 
became obsolete. 
These changes ultimately developed into neopatrimonialism and, as previously discussed, 
the political leader does not need the support of the population to survive because he or she has 
enough income from outside revenues such as rents. Clearly in the case of Djibouti, the 
enrichment of President Guelleh and his administration from rentierism removes the need for 
political support from the local population as a result of aid and income from leasing and port 
fees. On one hand, rentierism eliminated the need for a taxation system to sustain the 
government. On the other hand, rentierism eliminated the need for the government to provide 
services to the population of Djibouti. 
Rentierism, in return, ensures leaders of neopatrimonial governments stay in power, 
which in many cases promotes political corruption and creates several issues that are not 
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beneficial to economic or political development of a country. In Djibouti’s case, one example 
would be the Djiboutian government controlling the country’s sole communication network. 
With Djibouti Telecom owned by the government, the Guelleh Administration gains revenues in 
excess of USD 80 million, which is 7% of the country’s GDP.147 Djibouti does not need citizen 
support to garner income because they receive income through the country functioning as a 
rentier state. Because of this, Djibouti’s government is not threatened by the public, should they 
decide to challenge the government’s control of the country’s Internet and phone companies. 
Centralizing this area’s communication networks also allows President Guelleh and his 
government to suppress any ideas the public may have in response to the current situation. 
In the case of Djibouti, the Guelleh administration receives payments from other nations’ 
militaries for rented land and transportation costs, not for extracted goods. Once the government 
attains this wealth, the wealth feeds into other state-owned nonproductive activities such as the 
purchase of real estate and rent-generating commercial activities such as the Port of Djibouti. 
The purchase of and control of all communication networks by President Guelleh allows him to 
further consolidate and maintain control over the population. 
Rentierism also comes with potential threats, a remote one being the possible risk of 
hostile takeovers from investors. For example, with Djibouti hosting several militaries on their 
soil, a risk persists that one of those countries will try to suppress the government, if an ideal 
situation emerged. If this were to take place in Djibouti, the government, which depends on these 
entities for income, would be without a significant portion of their revenue and without the 
income from other lessees. Therefore, this possibility leads politicians like President Guelleh to 
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control communications systems such as the press, Internet, and phone lines from inside the 
country to regulate the flow of information. 
The neopatrimonial government of Guelleh and its dependence on government-controlled 
alienable assets or enclave economies to produce substantial rents has created the ideal rentier 
state. However, development of the geostrategic location of Djibouti requires massive capital 
investment to develop and cultivate, and cannot be accomplished through small-scale production 
that might integrate local business and industry. This system then places the dividends acquired 
from Djibouti’s natural resource—its strategic location—directly in the hands of the state. 
Djibouti’s leaders shape the way that money is cycled back into the economy. As Jennifer Brass 
explains, “At best, the GoRD neglects economic diversification. At worst, the government 
pursues an intentional policy of near-complete control over the economy and, by extension, the 
people.”148 By controlling the economy, the political leader is able to pay off key players through 
handouts, while the people remain dependent on the government. 
It is possible that China’s rent contribution to President Guelleh’s administration would 
permit some economic changes in the country. However, although some individuals are 
optimistic that China’s USD 20 million in base rent might allow President Guelleh to invest in 
local improvements such as building new roads, improving sanitation facilities, and overhauling 
the education system, chances of that happening, as seen by past year trends, are slim. As seen 
earlier in this document, although the GDP is increasing, currently at USD 1.9 billion up from 
USD 1.59 billion in 2014, the standard of living of local Djiboutians is declining. Poverty and 
unemployment rates are increasing, displaying the lack of government focus on its population. 
Instead of decreasing, as one would expect with a growing GDP and increased amount of money 
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entering the economy, these rates have actually increased. The number of people living on the 
national poverty lines increased from 2012 to 2013. In 2012, 18.3% of the population was living 
under USD 1.90 a day and 37% were living under USD 3.10 per day. In 2013, approximately 
22.5% of the population was living under USD 1.90 a day with 43.1% of the population living 
under USD 3.10 per day. Poverty rates taken from the Country Partnership Strategy for The 
Republic of Djibouti FY2014–2017 show that poverty in Djibouti is actually much higher with 
41.9% of the population in absolute poverty and 79.4% of the population in relative poverty.149 
Although recent numbers and statistics are unavailable, trends suggest that the actual number of 
people living in extreme poverty could be as high as 70%. Recent reports from the Djiboutian 
government and the World Bank have also shown that unemployment rates have increased to 
60% and 70% with no possible substantial decrease until around 2020. 
Additional challenges consist of a surplus of khat (which tranquilizes the country’s youth 
and prevents any opposition to the government), ethnic diversity, lack of schools (especially 
English schools), and no technical schools geared toward the economy’s needs. These issues 
exacerbate all possibilities of furthering the development of Djibouti’s economy. 
The neopatrimonial rentier state has moved to eliminate personal freedoms by controlling 
all forms of central communication. It is important to President Guelleh and his administration to 
consolidate control over political and economic areas to maintain constant income flow. This 
allows him to accumulate even more income, furthering his hold on power. By centralizing 
control of Internet and phone companies, he ensures citizens are limited in what information they 
can obtain in an attempt to remove any opposition. President Guelleh is keen and insightful about 
collecting money, but has not had to provide anything for his people and appears to lack any 
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sense of responsibility for their benefit. He rules the country using a dictator-type manner 
coupled with corrupt practices, which makes change difficult. This method of rule allows him to 
maintain control with little opposition; however, in doing so, corruption in Djibouti is increasing. 
Government accountability to Djiboutian citizens is waning, resulting in a declining domestic 
economy and an underdeveloped political economy that means Djibouti is not developing, but 
lagging behind other African states in the region. 
The private sector in Djibouti faces continuous challenges in establishing private 
businesses and accessing credit. Its energy system is unsustainable. By continuing to import its 
electricity, Djibouti uses valuable financial resources that could otherwise be spent on its people 
and their social-development challenges. However, recent attempts to develop Djibouti’s lesser 
known renewable resources, such as geothermal energy, are encouraging. 
If President Guelleh’s administration decides to diversify the economy, they would 
almost assuredly place themselves in a precarious position. For example, to diversify an 
economy, one would require an educated citizenry; yet an educated citizenry could result in a 
successful opposition, something the government seeks to avoid. Although in some cases 
educated masses are extremely useful for their country’s leadership, in the case of Djibouti, it 
would be seen more as a threat and to be avoided. 
Djibouti has solid prospects it can use to send the country on a path of sustained 
economic growth and development. In addition to using its location as a strategic resource that 
bring in rents and monthly incomes, it has renewable resources it can use such as solar, wind, 
and geothermal power. It also has a digital infrastructure, which is an asset that connects Djibouti 
with Asia, the Middle East, and Europe and has significant potential for the tourism industry. 
Once these plans are established and proven, Djibouti will be one step closer to being solely 
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dependent by the year 2020. If these newly recruited resources are properly used, the country has 
an opportunity to establish a thriving economy created from within; one which is not dependent 
on outside assistance. Finding alternative renewable and money-generating resources also 
permits the country to save money otherwise spent on expensive import and export costs, which 
would ideally flow down to low-income populations, thereby increasing Djiboutian citizens’ 
well-being. 
As previously discussed, Djibouti is plagued with issues. Although the GDP continues to 
increase, this increase does not accurately represent a strong economy because per capita income 
for the overwhelming majority in the country remains quite low. Djibouti’s main resource—
strategic location—is used to bring in rents and profits, all while controlled by a neopatrimonial 
government. The government, in return, uses the profits for personal gain, and not for its 
constituents. Thus, Djibouti’s natural resource as a geostrategic location for rent has had a 
negative impact on economic and political development. 
Olowu and Chanie state that as rental income increases, so does the strengthening of 
neopatrimonial systems.150 This can be seen in Djibouti as the number of countries coming to 
Djibouti seeking land to rent grows. The Guelleh administration encourages rent of national 
territory to obtain more income that, in turn, consolidates his control over the country. Although 
Mkandawire writes that neopatrimonialism is not necessarily synonymous with corruption or a 
state’s weakness, in this case, it is.151 If anything, present-day Djibouti is a prime example of 
neopatrimonialism equaling corruption and state weakness, in contrast to the other rentier state of 
Botswana, where the government reinvests rent of natural resources in public-sector healthcare 
and educational systems. The political exclusiveness of the Guelleh administration, through 
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corruption and centralization of power, continuous human rights violations, high unemployment 
and poverty rates, and lack of investment in adequate education and healthcare, is actually 
weakening the state. Outside of a select few, the Djibouti people have no allegiance to the state. 
Ola Agevall and Richard Swedberg explain that Max Weber saw patrimonialism as a 
form of traditional domination where the ruler sees the administration and military as his or her 
own personal instruments. They also claim that Weber saw patrimonialism as a way to justify the 
ruler governing by tradition. Once again, both of these thoughts are justifiable in Djibouti. The 
Guelleh administration is in complete control of his government and military and is the sole 
decision maker on governmental matters.152 Even though President Guelleh won in a democratic 
election, he took measures to eliminate any opposition for a meaningful democracy and has 
created an authoritarian government in which he maintains control as a dictator. This format is 
what his uncle, Djibouti’s first-president, used as well. 
In Milton’s study, he explains that as states grew, new hierarchies also grew. As seen in 
Djibouti, patrons transitioned into government officials, thereby maintaining position but gaining 
more responsibility.153 Since these positions originally were given to friends or relatives in the 
same ethnic group, no ethnic fraternization took place, making the government one-sided. 
Beekers and van Gool state that because the higher classes no longer gained riches by having the 
lower classes work for them, the higher classes become less dependent on the lower classes and 
the relationship between the two groups was broken.154 Djibouti exhibits this societal aspect as 
well, because the government does not need its citizens to obtain income. Therefore, the 
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government does not give anything to the population in return, making a relationship between 
the two groups almost nonexistent. 
As Mahdavy eluded to, cited at the beginning of the thesis, a country heavily dependent 
on natural resources to fund the government ultimately creates a weak state.155 However, it can 
be argued that with the challenges and issues facing Djibouti, the country does not have a weak 
state. In fact, one can argue that it does not have a state at all in the absence of key institutions 
such as a judicial system with effective policing and successful educational infrastructure. The 
lack of development extends to the poverty and unemployment numbers, both of which increased 
over the past several years. Olowu and Chanie suggest that it is often easier to maintain authority 
over rentier states by dispersing desired resources to the most favored constituents rather than 
promoting growth-oriented policies and equal opportunity.156 Djibouti is an example of this lack 
of opportunity as well because President Guelleh’s government favors the ethnic group of which 
he is part. This discriminatory practice, in turn, fosters corruption. 
In regard to rentierism, according to Boone, a rentier state amasses wealth in three ways 
and Djibouti practices all three.157 First, it obtains wealth through the privatization of state 
resources in an effort to boost profit and productivity. An example is rental income garnered 
from other nations’ militaries. The Guelleh administration receives payments for rented land and 
transportation costs. Once this wealth is attained, the government feeds it into other state-owned, 
nonproductive activities such as the purchase of real estate and rent-generating commercial 
activities, such as the Port of Djibouti. Second, it obtains money in the form of loans, subsidies, 
and cash transfers from other countries seeking to aid Djibouti in local projects. China aiding 
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Djibouti in the construction of an industrial-scale wind-power facility falls into this category. 
Third, the government obtains wealth from the collection of funds through bribes, payola, and 
government contracts obtained and awarded on a noncompetitive basis. Although this does occur, 
this information in undocumented in the literature. 
Most countries that choose to use rentierism as a means of income are corrupt and are 
seen as fundamentally damaging to the populace. Djibouti is no exemption. However, Booth 
argues that this idea should not be generalized and instead, as seen in some cases, such as 
Uganda, tend to have a positive outcome.158 In these few countries, government leaders have a 
structure in place for rent-income use as well as allow a collective group of individuals (outside 
of themselves) to make decisions on how this income is to be used. The focus is on long-term 
growth, based on specifically designed plans. If Djibouti could adopt this model, then President 
Guelleh could still have majority control over most decisions, but that income would finally 
reach his constituents. 
Djibouti is a unique country brimming with potential, but balancing on the edge of full 
dependency on others. The ultimate challenge for Djibouti is to encourage economic growth that 
is inclusive and more diverse in job creation while finding new ways of expanding the current 
market. Djibouti has several advantages that no other country has, and if the government can 
develop these assets further, they will be in a position to continue to become a magnet for capital 
and free trade. In contrast, in the absence of any investment in public goods like health, 
education, and job training, governance can only continue through increased use of state violence 
to maintain order, with great risk of growing disaffection of the people and growing security 
risks. 
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